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Abstract – Data transmission over wireless communication 
networks is increasing rapidly and security has become a 
very important issue.  The main considerations of secure 
communication systems are authentication, key 
distribution, and data transfer.  This paper describes a 
secure communication protocol (SCP), which provides 
privacy and data integrity for end-to-end data transmission 
over wireless communication systems.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
      As the use of electronic communications plays an 
ever-increasing role in business activities, security in 
communications through networking environments is 
becoming very important.  It is very important to 
preserve the confidentiality, data integrity, and 
authenticity of sensitive information to prevent fraud.    
Therefore, a secure layer (SL) with the above 
characteristics is required.   
      The SL, with reference to the OSI (Open System 
Interconnection) model, can be built between the 
application and transport layers (Figure 1).  SL is also 
required to be transparent and independent of the 
underlying layer (i.e. transport layer) to preserve the 
confidentiality and data integrity of sensitive 
information.    
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Secure Layer 
 
Therefore, the secure communication protocol (SCP), 
which is used by SL, is responsible for providing all the 
necessary encryption mechanisms to the application 
program to protect sensitive information.  
      In cryptography all modern algorithms use a key to 
control encryption and decryption; an encrypted message 
can be decrypted only if the proper key is available to the 
recipient.  The key used for decryption can be different 
from the encryption key, but for most algorithms they are 
the same. 
      There are two classes of key-based algorithms, 
symmetric (or private-key) and asymmetric (or public-
key) algorithms.  The difference is that symmetric 
algorithms use the same key for encryption and 
decryption (or the decryption key is easily derived from 
the encryption key), whereas asymmetric algorithms use 
a different key for encryption and decryption, and the 
decryption key cannot be derived from the encryption 
key.  The public-key algorithms permit the encryption 
key to be published, allowing anyone to encrypt with that 
key, whereas only the proper recipient (who knows the 
decryption key) can decrypt the message.  The 
encryption key is called the public key and the 
decryption key is called the private key [1].  
      Public key methods require in complex computations 
compared to secret key methods.  However, since the 
public key can be distributed through an insecure 
channel, key management is easier in public key systems.  
In addition, the public key schemes can be used to 
generate digital signatures for authentication [1].  
      When encrypted data is transferred over a noisy 
mobile channel, there are two synchronisation cases to 
consider.  The first is the initial synchronisation, where 
the receiver is initially synchronised to an incoming 
encrypted data stream.  The second case is re-
synchronisation, where the receiver maintains 
synchronisation to the incoming encrypted data stream 
after initial synchronisation [2].   
      A combination of public and private key schemes is 
supported by the secure protocol.  Public key schemes 
are used for key distribution and private key schemes are 
used to encrypt general traffic.  Furthermore, end-to-end 
encryption synchronisation is provided by the secure 
communication protocol.  
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II. SCP PROTOCOL OVERVIEW 
 
      The SCP protocol allows the transmitter and receiver 
to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption 
algorithm before data is transmitted.  The SCP lays on 
the application layer and it is protocol independent to the 
underlying transport protocols in use (i.e. UDP, TCP).   
      The SCP protocol provides connection security that 
has three basic properties: privacy, authentication and 
data integrity.  The connection is private because 
asymmetric key encryption is used to distribute a session 
key and data is encrypted using symmetric cryptography.  
The transmitter and receiver can be authenticated using 
symmetric, or public key, cryptography.  One-way hash 
functions are used to check data integrity. 
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      The protocol is composed by three phases: open 
session, data session, and close session.  Consider a 
situation where two stations A and B want to 
communicate securely (Figure 2).  When stations A and 
B first start communicating, they select cryptographic 
algorithms, authenticate each other, and use public key 
encryption techniques to distribute keys.  These 
processes can be summarised as follows:  In the open 
session phase station A, sends a session request to which 
the station B must respond with a session response 
message.  Following the session response, station A 
sends a session indication message to finalise the open 
session.   
      The session request, response, and indication, are 
used to establish security enhancement capabilities and 
key distribution between the station A and B.  The 
session request, respond, and indication establish the 
following attributes: authentication of stations A and B, 
agreement of cipher suite, and generation of session key.  
Both stations A and B involve in the session key 
generation, and enable one party to check whether the 
other party posses the secret key corresponding to the 
public key it receives from the other party.  Once the 
session key has been distributed secure data transfer can 
take place.    
      In the data session phase encrypted data is 
transferred.  The protocol identifies the contents of the 
data (i.e. text, speech, or video) and passes the 
information to the application program.  Encryption 
synchronization is also supported by the protocol to 
overcome synchronization problems that arise from 
dropped data frames due to channel errors [3].  
Synchronization frames are included in the data session 
phase.  In addition, data integrity is performed using hash 
functions.   
      Finally, the application program that receives the first 
close session request, sends a close session response to 
acknowledge the close of session.  The application 
program uses the close session phase to shut down a 
connection when it finishes using it.  The same operation 
is used to abort a session, in which case data transfer in 
both directions ceases immediately, and resources such 
as buffers are released.   
 
II.1 Open Session  
 
      When station A first connects to station B it is 
required to send the open session request as its first 
message.  The open session request includes a 
certificate, and a cryptographic algorithm identifier 
message.  Authentication is done with the use of 
certificates.  A certification authority (CA), which is 
assumed to be trusted by all users, is responsible for 
providing these certificates [4].  As shown in Table 1, the 
certificate message contains seven fields; the start 
delimiter (SD), the signature algorithm (SA), the signer 
(SG), the validity (VAL), the user identity (UID), the 
certificate (CER), and the public key (PK).   
Certificate Message (Request/Response) 
SD A start delimiter is used as a frame marker.  SD is a fixed 
8 bit number  
SA The algorithm used to sign the certificate (3 or 4 bits) 
SG The certification authority that signed the certificate (3 or 
4 bits) 
VAL The validity period of the certificate (32 bits) 
UID User identity (32 bits) 
CER Certificate (The size depends on the certificate standards) 
PK Public Key of the certificate authority (1024 or 2048 bits) 
 
Table 1.  Certificate Message 
 
      In the certificate and cryptographic algorithm 
identifier (Table 2) messages, SD is mainly used as a 
frame marker and is an 8-bit fixed number agreed by the 
certification authority.  The SA field indicates which 
algorithm is used, if multiple algorithms are supported, to 
sign the certificate.  SA can be either 3-bits or 4-bits 
length depending on the number of the cryptographic 
algorithms supported by the application program.  The 
SG field defines which certification authority signed the 
certificate.  Similarly, SG can be either 3-bits or 4-bits 
length depending on the number of the certification 
authorities.  The, VAL is used to indicate the validity 
period of the certificate.  The validity period is a 32-bit 
number expressed in seconds.  UID is a unique 32-bit 
number that identifies the user to the application 
program.  The CER field contains the certificate itself.  
Finally, the PK field contains the public key of the 
certification authority used to validate the certificate.    
      The cryptographic algorithm message immediately 
follows after the certificate message and contains six 
fields (Table 2);  
 
Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Message (Request) 
SD The start delimiter is used as a frame marker and is a 
fixed 8 bit number 
PKA If multiple public key algorithms are supported, PKA is 
the number of the algorithm used to encrypt session keys 
(8 bits) 
SMA The number of the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt 
traffic (4 bits) 
MCA Mode of the symmetric algorithm (4 bits) 
 
IV 
IV is used to initially synchronised the receiver to an 
incoming encrypted data stream (128 bits) 
PK Public key of the user (1024 or 2048 bits) 
TST The timestamp used to give limit lifetime to the 
transmission (32 bits - UNIX format) 
 
Table 2.  Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Message 
 
the public key algorithm (PKA), the symmetric algorithm 
(SMA), the mode of cryptographic algorithm (MCA), the 
initialisation vector (IV), the public key of the user (PK) 
and the timestamp (TST). 
      The PKA defines which cipher is used, if multiple 
algorithms are supported, to secure the distribution of the 
session key, expressed in 8-bit format (i.e. 
RSA=01100110).  Likewise, the SMA indicates which 
the cipher is used to secure traffic between the two 
applications.  SMA is expressed in 4-bit format (i.e. 
  
SAFER=0101, etc).  Furthermore, MCA defines the 
mode of the cipher, expressed in 4-bit format, that 
decreases the processing power and time of the 
application (i.e. ECB=0011, CBC=0101, etc).  The 
application program performs faster by knowing the 
number of bits to encrypt or decrypt in a block or a 
stream cipher.  Moreover, the IV field contains the 
initialised input of the block algorithms.  The IV used in 
the algorithms need not be secret and can be transferred 
in clear.  Finally, the TST is used to give a limited 
lifetime of transmission to prevent replay attacks.  The 
current time and date in standard UNIX 32-bit format 
(seconds since the midnight starting Jan 1, 1970, GMT) 
according to the sender’s internal clock.         
      When station B receives the open session request it 
will first check the timestamp and then authenticate 
station A.  Then, it will agree on the cryptographic 
algorithms and send an open session response.  The open 
session response includes a certificate, and a 
cryptographic algorithm message.  The certificate 
message includes the same fields with the one in the 
open session request (Table 1).  The cryptographic 
algorithm message, on the other hand, contains one extra 
field (Table 3); the random bytes (RB).  The random 
bytes (RB) field contains encrypted random bits and is 
used to certify whether station A and B posses the proper 
private keys.  The RB field is also used for the generation 
of the session key, which encrypts traffic between the 
two applications.  
 
Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Message (Response) 
Same as cryptographic algorithm message request (Table 2) 
 
RB 
Encrypted random bits used to generate one of the parts of 
the session key and to authenticate parties  
 
Table 3.  Cryptographic Algorithm Message Response 
 
      Finally, station A sends an open session indication 
message, which verifies the agreed public and key 
algorithm.  The open session indication message includes 
also the second part of the random bits used for the 
generation of the session key.  The random bits are 
encrypted using the public key of station B.  Applications 
can now hash the random bits to create the session key.  
 
II.2 Data Session 
 
      In the data session phase, the transmitted data is 
encrypted using the agreed cryptographic algorithm.  The 
data session message includes two identifiers used to 
determine the contents of data and the type of messages 
transmitted as shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Data Session Message 
SD SD is used as a frame marker and also as a session 
identifier (8 bits) 
MTI Indicates the type of the message (4bits) 
FTI Indicates the contents of the data transmitted (3 bits) 
SEQ SEQ is used to identify lost or duplicated messages (3 
bits) 
LEN The number of bytes received (32 bits) 
DAT Bytes Data  
DIC A hash value (64 or 128 bits) of the message received 
that acts as a CRC  
ED The end delimiter is used for synchronisation purposes 
and has the same value with SD (8 bits) 
 
Table 4.  Data Session Message 
 
      The message type identifier (MTI) indicates the type 
of message carried in the network, expressed in a 4-bit 
format (i.e. Filename = 0001, Data = 0010, Last Frame = 
0100, and Synchronization Frame = 1000).  The MTI 
field gives information to the upper layers to process the 
data received.  Likewise, the file type identifier (FTI), 
which may be 3-bits such as ‘001’ for text, is used to 
indicate the type of data carried in a frame (i.e. Text, 
Speech, or Video).   
      A start delimiter (SD) is also used to identify the 
beginning of the message.  The value of SD, expressed in 
8-bit format, is different in every session in order to 
avoid an unauthorized user to listen to the session.  
Similarly, the end delimiter (ED) identifies the end of the 
data message and mainly used for   synchronisation 
purposes.  The receiver is able to re-synchronise by 
checking the ED for out of sequence entry of a message.  
ED is the same 8-bit value as SD.  The sequence (SEQ) 
number is mainly used to identify lost or duplicated 
messages.   
      SEQ also enables the transmitter to send 
synchronisation messages after a fixed number of data 
messages.  Furthermore, the length (LEN) field defines 
the length of the data.  LEN is mainly used by the 
receiver to identify the stream of data received.  
Moreover, the data (DAT) field contains the actual 
information, which is encrypted with the agreed 
symmetric algorithm.  Finally, a data integrity check 
(DIC) is used to indicate if the data received is correct.  
The hash value of the data session message is included in 
the DIC field.  Thus, the receiver hashes the data 
retrieved to check the contents of the data session 
message.      
      Once the encrypted data is transmitted over a noisy 
channel, the receiver needs to maintain synchronisation 
to the incoming data stream after initial synchronisation.  
      Encryption synchronization is achieved by 
periodically sending synchronization information to the 
receiver.  This is particularly required by continuous 
media such as speech or video.  Synchronization 
messages can be transmitted using the data session 
message format.  Therefore, the MTI field defines a 
synchronisation message and the FTI field is set to the 
agreed SMA.  Furthermore, the DAT field contains the 
  
current IV to update the IV of the receiver and keep the 
key stream synchronised to the incoming encrypted data 
stream. 
         
II.3 Close Session 
 
      In the close session phase the application program 
that receives the first close session request will then send 
a close session response to acknowledge the closure.  
The close session request and respond messages include 
a SD, and a session release flag (SRF).   
 
Close Session Message (Request/Response) 
SD SD is used as a session identifier (8 bits) 
SRF SRF is a close session identifier for a request or response 
message 
 
Table 5.  Close Session Message  
 
SD indicates the session ID to close and SRF defines if 
the message is a close session request or response.  The 
8-bit value of SRF may be ‘11110000’ or ‘00001111’ for 
a close session request or response message respectively.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
      In this paper a secure communication protocol for 
mobile multimedia applications was presented.  The SCP 
is an independent secure layer found between the 
application and transport layers.  The transport protocols 
can be either connectionless or connection oriented.  The 
connection state, in other words, is not affected by the 
lost or out of order datagrams.  The application protocols 
retrieve information from SCP for the type of media 
transferred, and the cryptographic algorithms used to 
encrypt data.      
      SCP has the following novel properties.  Random bits 
are passed to the application program to generate the 
session key.  Thus, both transmitter and receiver are 
involved in the generation of the session key.  
Furthermore, the encrypted random bits exchanged, help 
the application program to check whether both parties 
possess the correct private keys.  Moreover, the protocol 
identifies the mode of the cryptographic algorithms (i.e. 
ECB, OFB etc.) which decreases the processing power 
and time used by the application.  In addition, SCP has 
data link protocol characteristics such as the message 
type identifier, which guides the application to download 
a multimedia file correctly.  Finally, the start and end 
delimiter used in the data session phase act as frame 
markers and identifiers, which change in every new 
session.  Thus, SD and ED prevent eavesdropping from 
taking place.             
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Communication between Station A and B 
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